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Introduction 
The last three decades have witnessed an explosion of studies around common property 
resources (CPRs). However, one major gap in the current literature on CPRs is the lack of 
research on urban commons (Colding et al., 2013). Urban ecology faces massive pressure due 
to urbanisation and population growth; on the other hand, natural resources such as urban 
wetlands also provide crucial ecosystem services [Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(Program), 2005]. The need of the hour is to protect and conserve them to tackle climate 
change.  
This study explores factors that impact the cooperation of the government with local 
communities for governing urban wetlands in Bengaluru, a city in south India. Urban wetlands 
play an important social and ecological role [Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Program), 
2005]. However, management of urban wetlands is challenging. Bengaluru, known as the 
‘Garden City of India’, has witnessed tremendous damage to its well-connected system of 
artificial lakes—a form of urban wetland. Recent efforts by citizen groups to rejuvenate and 
manage different lakes provide important insights into the fragmented governance of CPRs. 
The research question for this study is: what factors impact the cooperation of governmental 
actors with local communities, for collective action in management and rejuvenation of lakes 
in an urban setting? 
Methodology 
Due to a paucity of literature on urban commons, this is an exploratory study. To achieve 
the objective of this study, existing literature on natural resource management to identify 
factors that impact the cooperation of the government with local communities was first 
reviewed, followed by a review of studies on lakes in Bengaluru to identify additional 
factors. The author also conducted semi-structured interviews with four lake groups (at 
least two members from each group) that have been engaged in collective action in 
Bengaluru. Of the four lake groups, two were successful—hereby referred to as successful 
lake 1 (SL1) and successful lake 2 (SL2); and two were unsuccessful, hereby referred to as 
unsuccessful lake 1 (UL1) and unsuccessful lake 2 (UL2)—in rejuvenation and management 
of lakes to identify more factors as well as to validate the factors identified from existing 
literature. Additionally, the study will also look into how different factors impact successful 
and unsuccessful lake groups. 
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Literature Review 
Coordination and communication between different governance actors has been identified as 
an important factor that enables collective action for natural resources, both in theoretical 
models (Ostrom, 2000) and field experiments (Andersson, 2004; Meinzen-Dick, 2007). This 
factor becomes even more pronounced with the emergence of polycentric forms of 
governance, (Ostrom, 2010) which rely on nested enterprises (Ostrom, 2007, 2009) where 
multiple actors at different levels engage in management of natural resources.  
While there is a growing recognition that natural resource management requires a more 
holistic approach with an emphasis on creating institutions that enable collective action, it is 
also important to recognise that coordination between the multiplicities of actors is also 
accounted for. One obvious and extremely important actor in such institutional arrangements 
is the government (Agrawal, 2003; Bardhan, 2000; Meinzen-Dick, 2007). Agrawal and Gibson 
(1999) claim that governments can resolve intra-community and intercommunity conflicts, 
provide external intervention to change exploitative norms, provide specialised knowledge, 
resources and technical support that local communities do not possess. 
While the positive effects of government involvement have been highlighted above, it can also 
have negative effects including resistance to external imposition of rules by communities 
(Bardhan, 2000; Ostrom, 2000), frequent transfer of government officials, lack of coordination 
between government and other actors (Andersson, 2004) as well as between different 
government agencies (Ratner, Mam, & Halpern, 2014). 
The indispensable role played by the government in natural resource management makes it 
extremely important for other actors to cooperate with them by creating effective channels of 
communication. Andersson (2004) states that ‘for governance actors to be able to cooperate 
effectively they need to communicate effectively with one another’. However, poor 
communication between different government agencies across sectors acts as an 
impediment in the governance of natural resources (Ratner et al., 2014). This lack of 
communication hinders coordination due to differences in the actors’ preferences, interests, 
disparities in their access to power, resource and information, short tenures of government 
officials, presence of multiple government agencies (Andersson, 2004) and misaligned political 
and economic incentives (Gibson and Lehoucq, 2003).  
Problems of coordination can be overcome when actors engage in repeated interactions, 
valuing the future benefits of increased cooperation and are allowed to communicate face-to-
face. They should be able to discuss optimal joint strategy, exact promises from each other, 
give verbal tongue lashings and have a richer language structure coupled with the ability to 
read intonations and body language (Ostrom, 2000). 
Based on the above literature review, factors impacting the cooperation of the government 
chosen for this study are trust and reciprocity (includes repeated interactions and face- to-
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face communication); communication between different government agencies; frequent 
transfers; and resistance to external imposition of rules. Political and economic incentives 
were also identified as a factor. However, due to limitation of time, the author did not get the 
opportunity to interview government officials to understand their perspective behind certain 
decisions. Hence, these factors were dropped for this study. 
Context of Bangalore 
Historically, lakes in Bengaluru were managed by communities. Other than being a source of 
fresh water, they were also useful for agriculture, drinking, fishing, cattle washing and 
domestic uses (D’Souza & Nagendra, 2011; Sundaresan, 2011). As a result, the ecology of the 
lakes was shaped by different social conceptions and needs of different groups (Unnikrishnan 
and Nagendra, 2016). Over the years, the city has struggled to balance conservation and 
management of its resources with urban expansion and economic growth, (Unnikrishnan and 
Nagendra, 2015) leading to severe pollution and encroachment of lake areas. Additionally, the 
governance structure shifted from being community managed lakes to a more formal 
government structure during colonial times, which continued after independence with the 
number of government departments increasing progressively. This was accompanied by 
increasing migration, erosion of traditional communities, and changes in land-use pattern 
(D’Souza & Nagendra, 2011; Sundaresan, 2011). 
The focus in Bengaluru is often on economic growth, while conservation and management of 
natural resources takes a back-seat (Sundaresan, 2011; Unnikrishnan and Nagendra, 2016). 
Focussing on economic growth alone points to misaligned political and economic incentives 
for conserving natural resources. However, this can be tackled by mounting pressure on 
government officials through lake groups and civil society organisations as was done in the 
case of Guatemala (Gibson and Lehoucq, 2003) and previously in Bengaluru (D’Souza & 
Nagendra, 2011; Sundaresan, 2011). This section adds another factor: the ability to apply 
pressure on the government. 
Findings 
In addition to the factors identified above, the interviews revealed four more factors that can 
impact cooperation of the government. These factors are: presence of a committed 
government official in a position of power, political support, delayed action and deliberate non-
action, and downward accountability. The table below shows how the factors impacted the 
four lakes. 
Factor/Lake SL1 SL2 UL1 UL2 
Trust and reciprocity + + - - 
Communication between 
different government agencies 
- N.A. N.A. - 
Frequent transfers N.A. - N.A. -
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Factor/Lake SL1 SL2 UL1 UL2 
Resistance to external 
imposition of rules 
- - - - 
Ability to apply pressure on the 
government 
+ + - . 
Presence of a committed 
government official in a position 
of power 
+ + - - 
Political support N.A. N.A. - . 
Delayed action and deliberate 
non-action 
- - - - 
Downward accountability - - - - 
Table 1* + indicates a positive impact on the lake; - indicates a negative impact on the lake; indicates no impact on 
the lake and N.A. indicates that the factor was not found impacting the lake. 
In the case of successful lakes, it was clear that their efforts in rejuvenating and managing the 
lakes were strengthened by the presence of a committed government official in a position of 
power as well as trust and reciprocity. In both cases, the official was present in the 
government agency which had been mandated to manage the lake. On the other hand, UL 1 
neither had the support of the government agency responsible for managing the lake nor any 
official in it. UL 2 was able to garner the support of a junior officer in the government agency, 
but that officer could not wield significant power, thereby diluting his ability to influence 
governmental decisions.  
The findings also reveal that trust and reciprocity can be enhanced without face-to-face 
communication but not without repeated interactions. Establishing a point of contact is 
equally effective in enhancing trust and reciprocity as face-to-face communication, which both 
the successful lakes were able to do. Repeated interaction is still an important factor that 
impacts trust and reciprocity. While all the groups tried to apply pressure on the government 
through public events like signature campaigns, walkathons, human chain, and by repeatedly 
visiting government agencies, the effect was positive for only the successful groups. 
All four lake groups suffered due to resistance to external imposition of rules. UL 1 faced 
resistance from elected representatives. Despite receiving political support, UL 2 suffered 
from resistance to rejuvenate the lake, mainly by people or institution(s) wanting to make 
economic gains from high land prices around the lake. This problem was further compounded 
by its invisible presence. The lake group did not know the people or the institution(s) that were 
resisting rejuvenation of the lake. 
Delayed action and deliberate non-action was a general issue that plagued all four lakes. The 
government agencies delayed taking action against encroachments that the lake groups 
informed them about. In some cases, the government would respond after the encroachment 
15
construction was complete, by which time any action would be ineffective. Additionally, for 
the two unsuccessful lakes, the concerned government agencies never conducted a land 
survey of the lakes to demarcate their boundary despite several requests from the lake 
groups. A review of literature on CPR clearly highlights the importance of the presence of 
clearly defined boundaries for successful management of lakes. This non-action by 
government agencies was a major hindrance for the unsuccessful lakes. 
The lack of downward accountability was another issue that all the lake groups identified. In all 
cases the government agencies would give verbal commitment to take action on a complaint 
but rarely took any concrete steps. This also meant that the ability to put pressure on the 
government had limited impact. In some cases, the local ombudsman was able to put some 
pressure, but that was inadequate. The lack of political support also limited the impact of the 
pressure on the government as public events like walkathons, human chain, and a signature 
campaign did not solicit adequate response from the elected representatives. This also points 
to the fact that misaligned political incentives tend to dilute the effect of citizens applying 
pressure on the government to take action. Amongst other factors, lack of communication 
between different government departments was an issue for SL 1 and UL 4 while frequent 
transfers of officials were issues for SL 2 and UL 2. 
Conclusion 
The study shows that fragmented governance negatively impacts management of lakes due 
to problems associated with cooperation. The absence of a clear policy on management of 
lakes has led to a dilution in downward accountability of different government departments 
leading to delayed action and deliberate non-action on their part. Additionally, trust and 
reciprocity along with the presence of a committed government official are two of the most 
important factors that can determine the success or failure of natural resource management 
in an urban setting. 
The study reveals a few puzzles too. The puzzles relate to the interactional effect of different 
factors with each other. In case of UL 2, why was it that despite enjoying political support and 
applying pressure on the government, the lake group was unable to rejuvenate the lake? Did 
resistance to their efforts completely undermine all other factors? Or was it just the absence 
of a committed government official who would be apathetic to the cause of saving the lake, 
undermining all other efforts? While the study discusses some of the interactions, more 
research needs to be conducted to investigate it further. 
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